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It seems to the author that the effect of the Helgert decision is to
require attorneys to read section 310.045 (2) to mean that possible legatees, and possible devisees, possible heirs, and any possible surviving
spouse are persons interested. In any case where the attorney is not
positive that he has given formal notice to all possible interested parties,
it seems that he has little alternative but to publish notice of the hearing
to probate a purported will.
THOMAS A. PLEIN

Damages for Pain and Suffering in Wisconsin-In Rivera v.
Wollin the jury awarded the plaintiff four thousand dollars for past
pain and suffering and two thousand dollars for future pain and suffering arising out of an automobile accident. The trial court on motions
after verdict concluded that the damages were above "reasonably debatable amounts" and held that a reasonable amount for past pain and
suffering was three thousand dollars and one thousand dollars for future pain and suffering. The trial court in exercising its power of remittitur gave the plaintiff the option to accept the lower amount or
take a new trial on the issue of damages. The plaintiff accepted the
lower amount. However, the defendant appealed to the supreme court
of Wisconsin contending there was no basis in the record for any award
for future pain and suffering, and that the sum of three thousand dollars for past pain and suffering was still excessive. Thereupon the
plaintiff served a "notice of review" upon the defendant, stating that
the plaintiff would also seek a review by the supreme court of the actions taken by the trial court. The supreme court found that the award
of three thousand dollars for past pain and suffering was not excessive.
But, the court found no basis in the record for any award for future
pain and suffering and therefore held that the lower court should have
remitted the entire two thousand dollar award for future pain and
suffering rather than merely reducing it by one thousand dollars. The
court then gave the plaintiff the option to accept the three thousand
dollar judgment for past pain and suffering or to request a new trial
on the issue of damages.
The jury had originally awarded the plaintiff six thousand dollars
for pain and suffering. The trial court reduced the award to four thousand dollars, and the supreme court finally lowered the judgment to
three thousand dollars.
The expressed foundation for the supreme court's remittitur was
the following rule issued in the landmark case of Diemel v. Weirich:
[W]here the injury is subjective in character and of such a nature that a layman cannot with reasonable certainty know
whether or not there will be future pain and suffering, the courts
'30 Wis. 2d 305, 140 N.W. 2d 748 (1966).
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generally require the introduction of competent expert opinion
testimony bearing upon the permanancy of such injury or the
likelihood that the injured person will endure future pain and
suffering before allowing recovery therefor.2
While the court in Rivera determined that the Diemel rule was applicable, 3 it also found that the testimony of the plaintiff's expert medical witnesses was incompetent under the Diemel rule and did not afford
a basis for awarding damages for future pain and suffering.
I. FTuRE PAIN AND SUFFERING AND THE Diemel RULE
Prior to discussing the effect of the Diemel rule on the future pain
and suffering damages of this case, it should be pointed out that the
Diemel rule also applies to permanent injuries. However, in the Rivera
case there is no allegation nor finding of any permanent injuries.
In Rivera the court held as a matter of law that an application of
the Diemel rule foreclosed any award for future pain and suffering.
The substance of the rule provides that to allow recovery for future
pain and suffering caused by an injury that is subjective, that is, a type
of injury which a layman cannot observe physically and know with
reasonable certainty whether or not there will be pain and suffering,
there must be competent expert testimony as to the likelihood of such
future pain and suffering. 5
The plaintiff had argued to the supreme court that the subcutaneous
nodule discovered by his doctor's examination, was the source of the
plaintiff's pain and suffering, and was an objective symptom and not
within the Diemel rule. But, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument
that in the Diemel rule the term "objective" referred to symptoms capable of being measured and "subjective" as mere expressions of the
plaintiff. The distinction the plaintiff makes is a valid distinction, 6 but
2 264 Wis. 265, 268, 58 N.W. 2d 651, 652 (1955). Many recent Wisconsin cases

have cited with approval the rule declared in Diemel v. Weirich; Huss v.
Vande Hey, 29 Wis. 2d 34, 138 N.W. 2d 192 (1965); Casimere v. Herman,
28 Wis. 2d 437, 137 N.W. 2d 73 (1965); Borowske v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co.,
20 Wis. 2d 93, 121 N.W. 2d 287 (1963); Rogers v. Adams, 19 Wis. 2d 141,
119 N.W. 2d 349 (1963); Bleyer v. Gross, 19 Wis. 2d 305, 120 N.W. 2d 156
(1963).
330 Wis. 2d 305, 311, 140 N.W. 2d 748, 751 (1966).
4 Diemel v. Weirich, 264 Wis. 265, 268, 58 N.W. 2d 651, 652 (1955).
5 While the Diemel case and the cases supporting its principles presented the
requirement of expert medical opinion testimony, they failed to define the form
such testimony must take and only declared that it must be competent. In
Shawnee-Tecumseh Traction Co. v. Griggs, 50 Okla. 566, 151 P. 230, 231
(1915) the Oklahoma court held that
... there must be offered evidence by expert witnesses, learned in human
anatomy; who can testify, either from a personal examination or knowledge of the case, or from a hypothetical question based on the facts, that
the plaintiff, with reasonable certainty, may be expected to experience
future pain and suffering, as a result of the injury proven."
6 The definition proposed by the plaintiff is somewhat in accord with Corpus
Juris Secundum:
83 C.J.S., Subjective (1953) -"Subjective Symptoms. - In medicine those
symptoms which a physician or surgeon learns from what his patient tells
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does not in fact appear to be the one which Diemel apparently contemplated.
The Diernel rule requires expert medical testimony as a condition
for any recovery for future pain and suffering when the injury is of a
subjective nature. An injury might best be defined as subjective in nature when it is a type of injury that is not capable of being observed
and evaluated by a layman but can only be detected and measured by
some type of medical expert. This definition is typical of the various
7
definitions adopted by many courts.
Although the court rejected the plaintiff's definition of "subjective
injury," the court at the same time expressed dissatisfaction with the
phraseology of the Diemel definition. The court in Rivera proceeded
to rephrase the definition thus: "where the injury cannot be objectively
determined or where it is of such nature that a layman cannot with
reasonable certainty know whether or not there will be future pain and
suffering."" It is doubtful whether this language clarifies the Diernel
rule. It may in fact provide more difficulty.
The plaintiff's subcutaneous nodule was clearly a subjective symptom under the Dieme9 rule as originally defined and as redefined in
this case. The question that then presented itself was whether the plaintiff had sufficient competent expert opinion testimony bearing upon the
likelihood of future pain and suffering so as to allow a recovery for
future pain and suffering. Basically this question goes to the competency of the expert medical testimony as presented by the plaintiff.
How much medical proof is legally necessary so as to sustain an
award for future pain and suffering? It would appear that there must
be some proof as to the duration of the pain in the future and also the
degree of pain. The basic requirement applicable to expert medical
opinions generally should also be applicable under the Diemel rule. That
is, the expert opinion must be expressed at least in terms of probabilities and not mere possibilities."0 Such a requirement appears to have
him; those which a physician learns from the expressions of the patient;
those which a physician concludes exist because his patient says so; those
which are related by the patient, that cannot be observed by the physician,
but are learned by questioning the patient."
67 C.J.S., Objective (1950)-"Objective Symptoms. - In medicine those
which a physician, by the ordinary use of his senses, discovers from a physical
examination; those symptoms which a surgeon or physician discovers from
an examination of his patient."
However it should be mentioned that the Diemel rule is in fact the Wisconsin court's adoption of 20 AM. JUR., Evidence §778 (1939) verbatim.
Therefore the court adopts AM. Ju.ms definition of the term, "subjective"
and not that of C.J.S.
7See also Crye v. Mueller, 7 Wis. 2d 182, 197, 96 N.W. 2d 520, 529 (1959) and
Kearney v. Massman Construction Co., 247 Wis. 56, 69, 18 N.W. 2d 481, 487
(1945).
8 Rivera v. Wollin, 30 Wis. 2d 305, 313 N. 2, 140 N.W. 2d 748, 753 N. 2 (1966).
9 Diemel v. Weirich, 264 Wis. 265, 268, 58 N.W. 2d 651, 652 (1955).
10 See Bleyer v. Gross, 19 Wis. 2d 305, 312 120 N.W 2d 156, 160 (1963) and
Diemel v. Weirich, 264 Wis. 2d 265, 268, 58 N.W. 2d 651 (1955).
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been met in Rivera even though one of the plaintiff's examining doctor's
testimony as to future pain and suffering was expressed as a feeling
that the doctor had. 1 This did not violate the principle that a doctor
must testify as to medical probabilities.' 2
Rather, the real foundation for the court's determination that the
expert opinion elicited from the two expert medical witnesses was not
competent so as to allow recovery for future pain and suffering under
the Diemel rule is the fact that both doctors' testimony as to future pain
and suffering was based upon examinations of the plaintiff made about
a year prior to the actual trial. Commenting upon this fact the court declared:
Had Dr. Zupnik's opinion [as to future pain and suffering] been
based on observations which were reasonably current at the time
of trial, we would have no difficulty in finding that it fulfilled
the Diemel rule. His opinion spoke, however, as of fourteen
months before trial, and asserted, as of then, that the pain would
continue for an indefinite period, until healing was complete....
It is arguable, of course, as a matter of logic, that Dr. Zupnik's
opinion fulfills the Diemel rule because an indefinite period commencing November, 1963, may well include an indefinite period
commencing in January, 1965. We consider, however, that the
purpose of the Diemel rule is to introduce as much certainty as
reasonably feasible into a fact finding process that is highly
uncertain at best, that is, what is fair compensation for; such
pain as will probably be endured in the future. Bearing in mind
this purpose, and the particular circumstances here present, the
majority of the court conclude that Dr. Zupnik's opinion (as well
as Dr. Coles') were simply
too remote to be a foundation for an
13
award for future pain.

The court in effect held that as a matter of law the expert medical
testimony as presented by the plaintiff's medical witnesses, was not
sufficient to meet the Diemel requirement of "competent expert opinion
testimony."
It is obvious that in order to allow a judicial award for damages
for future pain and suffering, there cannot be a total physical recovery
at the time of the trial. In the present case, neither of the two testifying
doctors had examined the plaintiff at any time within eleven months of
the trial. In such a case, it is indeed difficult to visualize how they could
testify to a reasonable medical certainty as to the question of the plaintiff's pain at the time of the trial, let alone to a future time beyond the
trial.
The dissenting opinion, however, does present a strong argument
for holding that the majority erred in rejecting as a matter of law the
"1Rivera v. Wollin, 30 Wis. 2d 305, 311, 140 N.W. 2d 748, 752 (1966).
12 Rogers v. Adams, 19 Wis. 2d 141, 146, 119 N.W. 2d 349, 351 (1963).
13 Rivera v. Wollin, 30 Wis. 2d 305, 311, 312, 140 N.W. 2d 748, 752 (1966).
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testimony of the plaintiff's medical expert witnesses as to the future
pain and suffering:
I believe that this satisfies the legal requirement of Diemel v.
Weirich (1953), 264 Wis. 265, 58 N.W. (2d) 651, as recently
examined by this court in Huss v. Vande Hey [citation omitted].
In my view, this is true even though Dr. Zupnik's testimony related to a physical examination that was held about a year earlier.
The date of the doctor's examination might very well affect the
weight to be given to his opinion, but it would not render the
evaluation incompetent. Indeed, no claim is made that the opinion
was inadmissible. The majority opinion does not declare that
Dr. Zupnik's opinion was inadmissible, but, nevertheless, the
doctor's opinion is ruled to be insufficient as a matter of law. As
I read the record there was sufficient evidence to have enabled
the jury to conclude that there would in fact be future pain
4 and
suffering; this conclusion was approved by the trial court.1
The majority of the court had found in passing upon the trial court's
exercise of remittitur that the trial judge had come "very close to invading the province of the jury in weighing credibility" of the plaintiff
as a witness. 15 The question which the dissent here aptly presented,
was whether the supreme court had itself "usurped the jury's function
of weighing the evidence."' 16
Another problem left unsolved by Rivera is that if an examination
eleven months prior to trial is too remote as a matter of law to sustain
an award for future pain and suffering under the Diemel1 rule, then
at what time less than eleven months is the line of "remoteness" to be
drawn as a matter of law? Would an ad hoc determination based upon
the facts of each individual case, as to the nature of testimony, be
necessary, rather than creating a definite time line? Such a determination might well impair the jury's right to determine the credibility and
weight to be given to an expert's opinion testimony.
In an attempt to discover how other decisions have dealt with the
time lag between the doctor's last professional contact with the plaintiff
and the time of the doctor's testimony as to future pain and suffering,
the author has found that most court decisions have not considered this
factor at all in applying rules similar to that of Diernel. In the usual
case the plaintiff has actually visited the testifying physician a few days
prior to the trial.'8 Also, many of the appellate decisions do not mention either the last date the doctor professionally viewed the plaintiff
or the date upon which the doctor testifies in the trial.' 9 Without such
Id. at 316, 140 N.W. 2d at 754.
15 Id. at 315.
16 Rivera v. Wollin, 30 Wis. 2d 305, 316, 140 N.W. 2d 748, 755 (1966).
17 Diemel v. Weirich, 264 Wis. 265, 58 N.W. 2d 651 (1955).
isSee Borowske v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co. 20 Wis. 2d 93, 121 N.W. 2d 287
14

(1963); Albers v. Herman Mut. Ins. Co., 17 Wis. 2d 385, 117 N.W. 2d 364

19

(1962); Crye v. Mueller, 7 Wis. 2d 182, 96 N.W. 2d 520 (1959).
See Peterson v. Western Casualty and Surety Co., 5Wis. 2d 535, 93 N.W. 2d 433
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information it is impossible to know whether the court considered the
time lapse factor mentioned above.
The exception to the ordinary situation mentioned above is presented by Casimere v. Herman, in which the Wisconsin court in finding
the evidence insufficient to sustain an award for future pain and suffering did rely somewhat upon the fact that the testifying medical expert
had not seen the plaintiff for a long period prior to trial, except for a
chance meeting, as to which meeting the expert testified: "'I was not
able to assess whether she [the plaintiff] suffers from emotional disturbance at the present time.' "20 That case was in fact only a preview
of the present Rivera case, although Rivera made no mention of the
Casimere case.
There is therefore a definite lack of case history to guide one
through this area. The courts have in the past imposed the burden on
the plaintiff to establish his damages by a reasonable certainty. The
Diemel rule as applied by the court in Rivera seems to be an expression
of such theory as applied to future pain and suffering. But, Diemel has
defined the plaintiff's task of establishing his damages as to future pain
and suffering as one that absolutely requires competent expert opinion
testimony concerning such damages when the injury of the plaintiff is
subjective in nature. Whether the courts apply the Diemel rule or the
rule that damages for future pain and suffering must be established to
a reasonable certainty, the final results will often be the same. Under
either rule, introduction by the plaintiff of competent expert medical
opinion as to future pain and suffering would appear necessary to properly sustain an award for such damages. The court in Rivera repeated
the declaration made in Diemel:
It is a rare personal injury case indeed in which the injured
party at time of trial does not claim to have some residual pain
from the accident. Not being a medical expert, such witness is
incompetent to express an opinion as to how long such pain is
going to continue in the future. The members of juries also being
laymen should not be permitted to speculate how long, in their
opinion, they think such pain will continue in the future, and fix
damages therefor accordingly. Only a medical expert is qualified
to express an opinion to a medical certainty, or based on medical
probabilities (not mere possibilities), as to whether the pain will
continue in the future, and, if so, how long a period it will so
continue. In the absence of such expert testimony (which was
the situation in the instant case) the jury should be instructed
be allowed for future pain and suffering.
that no damages may
21
[Citation omitted. ]
(1958); Bleyer v. Gross 19 Wis. 2d 305, 120 N.W. 2d 156 (1963); Lucas

v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 17 Wis. 2d 568, 117 N.W. 2d 660 (1962).
2oCasimere v. Herman, 28 Wis. 2d 437, 137 N.W. 2d 73 (1965)-Appellant's Brief
and Appendix, Appendix-p. 116.
21 Rivera v. Wollin, 30 Wis. 2d 305, 310, 140 N.W. 2d 748, 751.
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EXERCISE OF REMITTITUR

The majority of the court2 found that the trial court could properly
determine that the four thousand dollar award for past pain and suffering was "beyond the range of reasonably debatable amounts," and thus
exercise remittitur, that is, present the plaintiff with the choice of accepting a lower award which the trial court fixed as reasonable or taking a new trial on the issue of damages. While affirming this part of
the trial court's actions, the majority of the court found that the trial
23
court came dangerously close to invading the province of the jury.

Wisconsin appears to be definitely committed to the theory of remittitur as provided in Powers v. Allstate Insurance Company.24 In
abolishing the old system of remittitur, the court in Powers declared:
We are firmly of the opinion that if the plaintiff were granted
the option of accepting a reasonable amount as determined by
the trial or appellate court, instead of the least amount that an
unprejudiced jury properly instructed might award, the number
of instances in which plaintiff would be likely to refuse such
option and elect a new trial would be greatly reduced. Furthermore, such alternative is one which appeals to our
25 sense of
justice, and is widely used in other jurisdictions.
A glaring problem left unsolved by the Powers case is concerned
with the scope of the trial court's inquiry in its determination of the
reasonability of the jury award. In particular the problem is concerned
with the balancing of the rights and duties of the court and the jury.
In the instant case, Rivera v. Wollin,-6 the court took notice of the fact
that the trial judge had remarked about the plaintiff: "he was not honest in the description of his injuries at trial" and pointed out that his
credibility "was substantially and frequently effectively shaken." In
so acting the trial court was found to have come "very close" to invading the province of the jury in weighing the credibility of the
plaintiff.2 7 The temptation of the court to take over the jury's function
22 Justice Fairchild who wrote the majority decision in effect declared that he
did not agree with the majority in holding that the judge could properly
determine that the $4,000 award was beyond a reasonably debatable amount.
It appears by implication that Justice Fairchild may have thought the judge
did invade the province of the jury in weighing the credibility of the plaintiff
as a witness as to his past pain and suffering. If that is so his presence as
part of the majority is somewhat anomalous. See Rivera v. Wollin, 30 Wis.
23 2d 305, 315, 140 N.W. 2d 748, 754 (1966).
Rivera v. Wollin, 30 Wis. 2d 305, 315, 140 N.W. 2d 748, 754 (1966).
24 10 Wis. 2d 78, 88, 102 N.W. 2d 393, 398 (1960). Powers v. Allstate Insurance
Company has been recently modified by Spleas v. Milwaukee & Suburban
Transport Corporation, 21 Wis. 2d 635, 646, 124 N.W. 2d 593, 598 (1963)
which provided, ". . . even though the excessive verdict may be the result
of a prejudicial error committed during the course of the trial, the Powers
rule may nevertheless be employed where such error directly relates to
damages."
25 10 Wis. 2d 78, 88, 102 N.W. 2d 393 (1960).
26 30 Wis. 2d 305, 140 N.W. 2d 748 (1966).
27 Id. at 314, 315, 140 N.W. 2d 754.
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of weighing the evidence and passing upon the credibility of witnesses
is especially acute in cases involving past pain and suffering damages.
The reason for such tendency is that the plaintiff's testimony as to past
pain and suffering is a legally sufficient foundation for a jury award,
even though no medical testimony is presented by the plaintiff to substantiate his past suffering. Even in cases such as Rivera, where there
is medical testimony concerning past pain and suffering, the plaintiff's
testimony as to the pain that he experienced is often a decisive factor
in the jury's award to the plaintiff. Therefore, in such cases the credibility of the plaintiff is a vital question. A court must, even under the
Powers 8 rule of remittitur, restrain itself and keep in mind the rule
laid down in Reddich v. Reddich:
The general rule governing the trial judge or appellate court
in determining whether damages are excessive is that since it
is for the jury, and not for the court, to fix the amount of
damages, their verdict will not be set aside merely because it
is large or because the reviewing court would have awarded
less. The court relies upon the good sense of jurors to determine the amount of damages and all that the court can do is
to see that the jury approximates a fair estimate. Where the
question is a close one, it should be resolved in favor of the
jury verdict.2 9
The extent to which a judge may base his exercise of remittitur upon
his estimation that a witness is not truthful is left somewhat doubtful
under Rivera. 30 It is arguable that the trial court did go beyond its
prerogative in this case and did invade the province of the jury.

III. NOTICE OF REVIEW UNDER SEcTION 274.12.
Near the end of the opinion the court discussed the merits of the
plaintiff's "notice of review." The court found that the plaintiff had
failed to serve timely "notice of review" under Sec. 274.12(1) Stats.
and was too late to seek a modification of the judgment which was
more favorable to him.
The little publicized appellate device which the plaintiff attempted
to use, the "notice of review" is created by section 274.12(1) :
A respondent adverse to the appellant upon the latter's appeal
may have a review of any rulings prejudicial to him by serving
upon the appellant at any time before the case is set for hearing
in the supreme court a notice stating in what respect he asks
for a reversal or modification 3 of the judgment or order or
portion thereof appealed from. '
28

Powers v. Allstate Insurance Company, 10 Wis. 2d 78, 102 N.W. 2d 393

(1960).
Wis. 2d 37, 43, 112 N.W. 2d 131, 134 (1961).

2915

3o Rivera v. Wollin, 30 Wis. 2d 305, 314, 315, 140 N.W. 2d 748, 754 (1966).
31 WIs. STAT. §274.12 (1) (1963).
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In Plesko v. Milwaukee the court held that a plaintiff who had
accepted a reduced amount of damages upon the trial court's exercise
of remittitur could not thereafter appeal such reduction. However if
the "opposing party appeals, the party who has accepted the option
to take judgment for such a reduced amount of damages may nevertheless have a review on appeal of the trial court's determination of
the damage issue."' 32 The purpose of not allowing a plaintiff to accept

a reduced award upon the court's exercise of remittitur and then to
appeal such action was to decrease the number of appeals. Once the
defendant has appealed, the reason for prohibiting the plaintiff to
appeal has vanished. 33
The court held in Rivera34 that the plaintiff could not seek a review under section 274.12(1) because the statutory requirement was
not followed. The defendant was not given notice of the plaintiff's
request for review until sometime after the case had been "set for
hearing" 35 by the court. But, the court pointed out that "to the extent
that the correction of the claimed error would merely support the
judgment appealed from, a notice of review is unnecessary." This
portion of the court's position is only a reiteration of section 274.12(2).
The court then stated:
Thus we may review the action of the court in setting aside
the $4,000 award for past pain and suffering, because if that
was error, our correction of it would merely support the judgment. If we determined the $4,000 award should be reinstated,
the present judgment would be supported, even though we dein error in including $1,000
termine that the trial court was
36
for future pain and suffering.
The court seemed to impliedly hold that while the plaintiff could
not properly seek a recovery of the whole six thousand dollar jury
verdict as provided for under section 274.12(1) because of lack of a
timely notice of review to the defendant; the plaintiff could seek,
without timely notice (or any notice at all), a review of the lower
court's action of section 274.12(2) so long as the amount of the award
sought to be reinstated does not cause the total recovery to exceed
the amount of the trial court's judgment after remittitur, that is, four
thousand dollars.
The court has in effect determined that because there is no proper
basis under the Diemel rule for any damages for future pain and
suffering, that that part of the plaintiff's request for review concerning the original jury award of two thousand dollars should be disregarded. Thus, his request would be limited to the amount of four
32 19 Wis. 2d 210, 220, 120 N.W. 2d 130, 135 (1963).

33Ibid.

34 Rivera v. Wollin, 30 Wis. 2d 305, 314, 140 N.W. 2d 748, 753 (1966).
35 WIs. STAT.§274.12 (1) (1963).
36

Rivera v. Wollin, 30 Wis. 2d 305, 314, 140 N.W. 2d 748, 753, 754 (1966).
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thousand dollars, which is not more favorable than the lower court's
judgment and therefore is not subject to subsection (1)'s notice requirement.
The court is correct in holding that under 274.12(2) there need
be no notice of review of any error if the correction of which would
merely support the judgment or order appealed from.3 7 But, prior to
the court's finding that the trial court should have as a matter of law
refused to allow any award for future pain and suffering, rather reducing that part of the award from two thousand to one thousand
dollars, the request of the plaintiff for reinstatement of the original
jury award, six thousand dollars, was in actuality a request for a
correction which would be greater than the judgment granted by the
trial court, four thousand dollars. The supreme court seemed to be
acting with hindsight in its determination that subsection (2) applied.
In actuality, the plaintiff had sought a correction which if made,
would have been more favorable to him and would not have merely
"support the judgment.' ' 3 Thus, the court's application of section
274.12(2) under the facts seems to be questionable.
DAVID W.

LEIFKER

Damages: The Declining Significance of the Ad Darnnum Clause
-The plaintiff in Zelof v. Capital City Transfer, Inc.1 brought an action against the defendant moving company for damages resulting
from its alleged negligence in packing and moving some of her household effects. The ad damnum clause in the complaint was in the sum
of $1070.33. After finding the defendant liable the jury assessed plaintiff's damages at $3000.00. The trial court allowed the plaintiff to
amend the ad damnurn clause to $3000 in order to conform the pleading to the verdict, but subsequently held that the applicable law required that the amendment be allowed only if the defendant were
granted a new trial on the issue of damages.
On appeal the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that:
"... under sec. 270.57, Stats. and sec. 269.44, Stats. the court has
the power after verdict and before judgment in furtherance of
justice and upon such terms as may be just to allow an amendment to increase the amount of the ad damnum clause to the
amount of the verdict so the pleadings and verdict will support a
judgment of the amount awarded.
WAhat are just terms necessarily depends upon the facts of the
case. When a defendant is in fact misled by the amount of the
ad damnum clause, the court may well impose different terms
than when the defendant cannot prove he has been misled. No
mathematical rule of disparity between the amount of the verdict and the ad damnum clause can be formulated.
37
WIS. STAT. §274.12 (2) (1963).
129 Wis. 2d 384, 139 N.W. 2d 1 (1966).

